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Abstract 
This paper addresses the problem of measuring the welfare benefits of a transport 
improvement. We formulate and analyze a rich spatial model that allows for spillovers, 
matching and income tax, in a setting with multiple work and residential locations and 
very general worker heterogeneity.  The conventional consumer surplus captures part 
of the benefits and is calculated based on predictions of changes in travel demand and 
transport costs. The issue is to determine which so-called wider impacts to add to this. 
We find that adding the change in total output as a wider impact leads to double-
counting of benefits.  The output change due to spillovers should be added, while the 
output change due to matching is already partly included in the consumer surplus. 
These results are useful for applied cost-benefit analysis of transport policies. 
JEL: R4, D6, H4 
Keywords: Agglomeration; spillovers; matching; cost-benefit analysis; transport policy 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Conventional cost-benefit analysis of transport projects relies on the consumer surplus on 
transport markets to capture all the benefits of transport improvements. This approach is valid 
provided there are no imperfections on secondary markets (Jara-Díaz, 1986; Kidokoro, 2004, 
2006; Mohring, 1993). It is also an extremely applicable approach as the analysis can be based 
simply on a traffic forecast with no need for complicated economic modeling. The practicality of 
this approach is a main reason that transport policy, in contrast to many other policy areas, is 
routinely subjected to economic evaluation around the world.  
There is, however, a growing realization that secondary market imperfections may have 
significant impacts that are relevant for the economic evaluation of transport projects. In the last 
decade or two, the importance of labor and product market imperfections has been increasingly 
appreciated both among researchers and practitioners. The UK SACTRA report (SACTRA, 1999) 
was a milestone in this development, as was the subsequent high-profile case study of the London 
Crossrail project (Worsley, 2011). The term “wider impacts” (sometimes “wider economic 
benefits”) arose as part of the UK work and refers to the welfare effects of a transport 
improvement that are additional to the change in the consumer surplus. The issue of wider 
impacts is then how to modify a conventional cost-benefit analysis to take into account secondary 
market imperfections. 
In an influential paper, Venables (2007) set up a classical monocentric city model where 
productivity in the CBD depends on the total employment there. The city is open such that a 
transport cost reduction increases urban employment. This leads to the first wider impact, which 
is increased tax revenues arising since workers receive higher wages in the city than outside. The 
second wider impact is that the increased employment in the CBD increases productivity through 
agglomeration effects. 
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Agglomeration effects are fundamental drivers behind urbanization and economic growth. The 
degree of agglomeration at a location may be measured through the concept of accessibility, used 
to summarize the spatial availability of opportunities while taking transport costs into account. 
The mechanisms through which accessibility can increase productivity are summarized by 
Duranton and Puga (2004) in the phrase “sharing, matching and learning”. In brief, sharing refers 
to the sharing of specialized inputs, matching refers to the matching of workers to employment 
opportunities, while learning refers to the process where workers and firms learn from each 
other. All three mechanisms are facilitated by agglomeration, but our understanding of the 
relative importance of the three mechanisms is limited (Melo & Graham, 2014; Puga, 2010).  
From the transportation perspective there is an important distinction between sharing and 
learning on the one hand and matching on the other. If a transport improvement leads to better 
accessibility of workers to jobs, this will increase the thickness of the labour market, and will tend 
to increase the average quality of worker-job matches and the probability that workers find jobs 
at all. If at least some of these benefits (higher matching quality and employment probability) are 
reflected in higher wages and thus accrue to workers, then the after-tax part of this effect is 
internal to the workers’ choice of job and will then be reflected in the consumer surplus in the 
transport market1. In contrast, the effects of improved accessibility through sharing and learning 
are generally external to the workers’ commute decisions. Matching effects must therefore be 
treated differently from sharing and learning effects in a transport cost-benefit analysis. 
In Venables (2007), all employment is located in the CBD and agglomeration is measured simply 
as total employment in the city. There is then no way for transport improvements to affect the 
degree of agglomeration except through the size of the city. The dependency of productivity on 
total employment may be thought of as describing sharing and learning effects. We refer in this 
paper to the sum of these effects as spillovers. Matching is, however, not captured in Venables’ 
setup with only one work location.  The Venables model is therefore also unable to predict, e.g., 
situations where transport improvements attract workers to low productivity locations and 
thereby cause negative wider impacts.   
The aim of the current paper is similar to that of Venables (2007), but we use a setup that allows 
for matching as well as a description of accessibility that incorporates transport costs. We 
consider a finite number of work and residential locations in an arbitrary spatial arrangement, 
which may be taken to represent a city or indeed a whole country. The residential locations of 
workers are fixed while the worker choice of workplace is endogenous, described by a general 
random utility model. A worker’s choice of workplace is influenced by transport costs as well as 
the wage, net of income tax, at each work location. The wage at each work location is in turn the 
product of a productivity that is specific to each combination of workers and jobs and a local wage 
rate (per productivity unit) at each job that depends on the accessibility from that workplace to 
workers at other work locations. The accessibility is the sum of employment at each work location 
weighted by a decreasing function of job-to-job transport cost (reflecting the impedance of 
information and interaction between workers). In this way, accessibility and hence the local wage 
rate (per productivity unit) reflects the spatial distribution of workplaces as well as transport 
costs. 
An additional feature of the present model is that it allows unemployment to exist and to be 
endogenous. The model is sufficiently general that one work location can be interpreted as 
unemployment. The local productivity would be zero such that unemployment yields zero wage 
while commuting costs to unemployment would be zero.  
                                                             
1 As pointed out in Duranton and Puga (2004), there may also be situations where matching mechanisms also 
create external benefits, in addition to the internal benefits, even in the absence of tax distortions – for example if 
employers have monopsony power . In this paper, however, we focus on matching benefits which are internal to 
workers. The matching mechanism we use in our model affects productivity (through commuting costs affecting 
the quality of the firm-worker matching), but does not produce matching externalities (apart from tax revenues).   
3 
 
We find two sources of wider impacts of a transport improvement in this model. As in Venables’ 
model, the change in total output is important but we must decompose this change into two parts: 
the change in local wage rates holding local employment constant, and the change in local 
employment holding local wage rates (per productivity unit) constant. These mechanisms are 
already understood in the literature, and in some application guidelines such as the UK WebTAG. 
This paper provides a rigorous and general framework for understanding these mechanisms. 
The first part of the change in output, the change in local wage rates, is due to changes in job-to-
job accessibility and may be thought of as representing spillovers, i.e. sharing and learning effects. 
All of this should be counted as a wider impact, part of which accrues to workers and part of which 
is tax revenue.  
The second part directly reflects the workers’ choice of work locations and it is then a matching 
effect. This effect is what the UK WebTAG calls the ‘move to more productive jobs’. The tax½ share 
of this is tax revenue and should be counted as a wider impact. The remainder is part of the 
consumer surplus and should therefore not be counted as a wider impact.  
The wider impacts in the present model may be positive or negative, depending on whether the 
transport cost reduction induces workers to shift employment toward high- or low-productivity 
locations. Again, this is an effect that cannot be represented in the monocentric city model used 
by Venables. 
In return for allowing multiple work locations and thereby a matching effect, we have to assume 
that residential locations are fixed. We cannot then obtain the effect present in Venables (2007) 
whereby an urban transport improvement attracts workers from elsewhere. However, as we have 
a very general representation of space, we can take our model to represent a whole country, which 
makes the issue of variable population size fairly moot. Still, our assumption of fixed residential 
location is a constraint that could be lifted in future work. 
1.2 Previous literature 
The positive relationship between productivity and city size (an easily available proxy for 
accessibility) was pointed out already by Smith (1776) and Marshall (1890). Starrett’s 
impossibility theorem (Starrett, 1978; Ottaviano & Thisse, 2004) showed that agglomeration 
effects are necessary to explain the existence of large cities. A large number of studies have 
confirmed the correlation between high accessibility and high productivity (Rosenthal & Strange, 
2004). Early studies used city size (population or number of jobs) as a proxy for accessibility, 
while more recent studies have used measures of economic density (Graham, 2007a; Graham & 
van Dender, 2011) or accessibility measures derived from transport models (Anderstig, Berglund, 
Eliasson, & Andersson, 2016; Norman, Börjesson, & Anderstig, 2017).  
Recent studies have also shown that not all of the observed correlation between accessibility and 
productivity is causal; sorting and self-selection among workers and firms also play a role 
(Combes, Duranton, & Gobillon, 2008; Graham, Melo, Jiwattanakulpaisarn, & Noland, 2010). Still, 
effects of accessibility on productivity persist even after controlling for sorting (Börjesson, 
Isacsson, Andersson, & Anderstig, 2015; Maré & Graham, 2013). Of particular interest is a recent 
and careful study by Melo and Graham (2014), showing that matching effects (the quality of  the 
employee-employer relation) are indeed an important part of agglomeration effects, even after 
controlling for endogeneity and selection.  
Puga (2010) points out that disentangling the sources of agglomeration sources empirically is 
very difficult, since they all “share the prediction that productivity increases with the scale of an 
activity at a location”, what Duranton and Puga (2004) term “Marshallian equivalence”. Puga 
(2010) then goes on to identify a number of ways which could be used to distinguish 
agglomeration mechanisms empirically. The aforementioned work by Melo and Graham (2014) 
expands one of these ideas and applies it empirically, showing that matching indeed seems to 
contribute to agglomeration effects. Earlier works which have also shown that matching is one of 
the fundamental sources of agglomeration effects are Gan and Li (2016) (studying recruitment of 
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new PhDs economics) and Costa and Kahn (2000) (studying location choices of couples with 
college degrees).  
Cost-benefit analysis in an economy with distortions has a long history, and in a general sense, the 
conclusions in the present paper are not new. Harberger (1971) showed that the value of any 
changes in externalities should be added to the consumer surplus. Dreze and Stern (1987) extend 
and generalize Harberger’s work, using the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) framework as a starting 
point. They set up general CBA rules, including the treatment of tax revenues and positive and 
negative externalities. The main focus in the current paper – the overlap between consumer 
surplus and increased economic output – is not treated in any of these frameworks. Interestingly, 
one of the main points of Harberger’s paper is that welfare analysis should not only use “national 
income” as an evaluation measure, since there are benefits which fall outside measurable 
economic output. Instead, consumer surplus should be the foundation of social CBA, since it 
“captures citizens’ revealed preferences in other dimensions than just income”. In this sense, CBA 
in the transport sector has come full circle: the notion of “wider economic benefits” highlights that 
what today’s methodology is missing is the part of economic output that falls outside consumer 
surplus, rather than the other way around.  
Harberger  (1971) also notes that changes in monopoly profits should be included. Such benefits 
are often included in the wider economic impacts, but we do not treat them in the current paper 
(even if, as Harberger also points out, monopoly profits can for many purposes be treated as “just 
another tax”). Kanemoto (2013a) extends the work of Venables (2007) by considering imperfect 
competition, examining whether the results remain valid when monopolistic competition with 
differentiated products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration economies. Kanemoto 
(2013b) summarizes and compares earlier results for such CBA rules, i.e. situations with price 
distortions associated with imperfect competition. These models do not include worker/firm 
matching as a source of agglomeration benefits, however. Kidokoro (2015) considers cost benefit 
analysis in a city where the source of agglomeration benefits is the local number of varieties of a 
differentiated good. He also does not include worker/firm matching as a source of agglomeration 
benefits 
Calthrop et al. (2010) consider the implications of tax distortions and interactions with the labor 
market for transport project cost-benefit analysis, while Fosgerau and Pilegaard (2008) consider 
the implications of search unemployment. Search unemployment is related to worker-to-job 
accessibility, which means there is some conceptual overlap with the matching effect considered 
here. 
1.3 Layout 
Section 2 presents our theoretical model for which we are able to derive the welfare consequences 
of a transport improvement in terms of consumer surplus, a spillover effect and a matching effect. 
Section 3 presents some additional analytical results for a simplified version of the model where 
spillovers are purely local. Here we establish conditions that ensure unique existence of 
equilibrium, a result that informs about when a transport improvement can be expected to 
increase or decrease total output, and conditions that ensure that an income tax increase will 
reduce total output. Section 4 illustrates the model with a series of simulations. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Model formulation and basic result 
2.1 Model formulation 
Workers are divided into a finite number of types 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼. The types distinguish workers by 
residential location as well as other characteristics such as education and experience. There are 
𝑁௜  workers of type 𝑖, treated as a continuum, and the total population 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁௜௜ > 1. The type of 
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each worker, including the residential location, is fixed, which means that the model does not 
allow workers to move residence. 
There is also a finite number of job types 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. The job types distinguish jobs by location and 
by other characteristics such as industry and specific job characteristics. The generalized 
commuting cost for type 𝑖 workers to type 𝑗 jobs is non-negative and denoted by 𝑐௜௝ . This allows 
workers of different types to have different commuting costs, even if they have the same 
residential location. Residential and work locations with the same physical location could have 
commuting cost of zero. 
A productivity level 𝑞௜௝ ≥ 0 is associated to each worker-job match. There is an endogenous wage 
rate per productivity unit 𝛾௝ > 0 at each location, taken as given by workers, such that a worker 𝑖 
in job 𝑗 receives a gross wage of 𝛾௝𝑞௜௝. This income is taxed at the exogenous rate 𝜏. Finally, a 
worker 𝑖 in job 𝑗 receives an idiosyncratic money-metric utility shock 𝜖௜௝ . For each type 𝑖, the 
vector with elements 𝜖௜௝ , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 follows an absolutely continuous multivariate distribution 
with finite mean and a density that is everywhere positive. These shocks need not have mean zero, 
such that the model may accommodate that not all types of workers are equally suited for all types 
of jobs. 
A worker 𝑖 working at job 𝑗 then obtains random utility  
 𝑢௜௝ = (1 − τ)𝛾௝𝑞௜௝ − 𝑐௜௝ + 𝜖௜௝ . (1) 
He/she chooses job type to maximize this random utility and then chooses job 𝑗 with probability 
 𝑃௜௝ = 𝑃 ൬𝑢௜௝ = max௝ᇲ 𝑢௜௝
ᇲ൰. (2) 
This means that the model comprises a matching effect, whereby it is more worthwhile for high 
productivity workers to incur higher transport costs in order to reach a work location with higher 
wage rate. The model then comprises a mechanism that induces high productivity workers to 
commute longer, ceteris paribus, in accordance with European empirical evidence (Carra, Mulalic, 
Fosgerau, & Barthelemy, 2016). 
The equations (1) and (2) describe a standard additive random utility model (McFadden, 1981). 
We shall make use of a few general results for such models; they can be found in (Fosgerau, 
McFadden, & Bierlaire, 2013). 
Denote 𝐺(𝑚; 𝑖) = 𝐸 max
௝
൛𝑚௝ + 𝑢௜௝ൟ. This is the surplus function, i.e. the expected maximum utility 
for workers of type 𝑖. It is written as a function of location shifts 𝑚 = ൫𝑚ଵ, … , 𝑚௃൯, which serve to 
facilitate differentiation of 𝐺; the location shift vector is zero in the model and we shall suppress 
it in the notation, writing just 𝐺(𝑖). As is well known2 proved by, 𝐺 is a convex function of 𝑚 with 
partial derivatives at 𝑚 = 0 satisfying 𝐺௝(𝑖) = 𝑃௜௝ and the hessian of 𝐺(𝑖) is positive semidefinite. 
Moreover, the second partial derivatives satisfy 
 𝐺௝௝(𝑖) ≥ 0 
𝐺௝௞(𝑖) ≤ 0, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 
𝐺௝௝(𝑖) = − ෍ 𝐺௝௞(𝑖)
௞ஷ௝
. 
(3) 
We assume that 𝐺௝௝(𝑖) is bounded by a constant. This condition is satisfied by the multinomial 
logit model, where 𝐺௝௝(𝑖) = 𝑃௜௝൫1 − 𝑃௜௝൯ ≤ 1/4. The condition bounds how quickly the work 
location choice probabilities can change.  
                                                             
2 See, e.g., Fosgerau et al. (2013). 
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Note that we allow considerable generality by allowing the distribution of the random utility 
components 𝜖௜௝ to vary by worker type and by not restricting the distributions in any way except 
for the mild regularity condition just stated.  
The number of commuters of type 𝑖 to 𝑗 is  
 𝐷௜௝ = 𝑁௜𝑃௜௝(𝑞) (4) 
and the effective labor supply at job 𝑗 is 
 𝐿௝ = ෍ 𝑞௜௝𝐷௜௝
௜
. (5) 
Let 𝑑௝௞  be the elements of a matrix of non-negative transport costs from job 𝑗 to job 𝑘. The 
commuting costs 𝑐௜௝ and the job-to-job transport costs 𝑑௝௞ are different in general but may be 
derived from the same underlying transport network, such that a change in the transport network 
has impact on both kinds of transport costs.3 We also define a decay function 𝑤 that is decreasing 
and differentiable with 𝑤(0) = 1 and 𝑤(∞) = 0. Then we define the job-to-job accessibility at job 
𝑗 as a weighted sum of local effective labor supply where the weights are inversely related to the 
job-to-job transport cost through the decay function: 
 𝐴௝ = ෍ 𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯𝐿௞
௞
. (6) 
The job-to-job accessibility captures the effect of spillovers (sharing and learning) on the local 
wage rate (per productivity unit), which is given by  
 𝛾௝ = 𝐴௝
ఎೕ , (7) 
where 𝜂௝ ≥ 0 is a local parameter that determines the returns to job-to-job accessibility at 
location 𝑗. When 𝜂௝ = 0, the local wage rate is constant and equal to 1. 
Production takes place with labor as the only input and the value of production is returned to 
workers. Then the output from job 𝑗 is  
 𝑌௝ = 𝛾௝𝐿௝ . (8) 
The total production from all jobs is denoted 𝑌 = ∑ 𝑌௝௝  and then the total revenue from the income 
tax is 𝜏𝑌. 
Welfare is measured as the expected utility of all workers plus the income tax revenue.  
 𝑊 = ෍ 𝑁௜
௜
𝐺(𝑖) + 𝜏𝑌. (9) 
The model may seem restrictive in that it appears to require all workers to actually work. But the 
model can in fact accommodate some workers being unemployed. This can be achieved by 
designating, say, job type 0 as unemployment and setting 𝑞௜଴ = 0. The transport costs to job 0 can 
be set to zero or to some negative transport cost that can represent an unemployment benefit.  
                                                             
3 It should be pointed out, however, that while decades of research have provided a good understanding of how 
generalized commuting costs depend on monetary costs, travel time components and several other factors, much 
less is known about how generalized transport costs affect spillover effects, what we here call “job-to-job 
transport costs”. In our model, they are interpreted as the impedance of contact, interaction and information 
between workers at different job locations. Understanding commuting costs is comparatively easy since 
commuting patterns are observable, allowing researchers to study how generalized commuting costs are made up 
of monetary costs, travel time components and so on. Understanding, for example, the impedance of information 
flow or worker interactions is clearly much harder, since the spillovers that we model here are not observable in 
the same simple way.  
7 
 
2.2 The welfare consequences of a transport cost reduction 
Transport costs enter the model both as commuting costs 𝑐௜௝  and as job-to-job transport costs 𝑑௝௞. 
A change to the transport network will affect both kinds of transport costs. It is however 
convenient to consider them separately. We begin with the commuting costs, considering without 
loss of generality a reduction in just one commuting cost. 
Theorem 1. The welfare effect of a commuting cost reduction is 
 
−
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= 𝐷ଵଵ − 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
− (1 − 𝜏) ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
 
= 𝐷ଵଵ − ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
− 𝜏 ෍ 𝛾௝
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ௝
. 
 
(10) 
The first row decomposes the welfare effect into consumer surplus, increased tax revenues, and 
the after-tax part of increased wage rates due to spillovers. The second row decomposes the 
welfare effect into consumer surplus, increased wage rates due to spillovers, and increased tax 
revenues from matching effects. 
Proof.  
 
−
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= − ෍ 𝑁௜
௜
𝜕𝐺(𝑖)
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
− 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= ൣ𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝐺௝(𝑖) = 𝑃௜௝൧ = 
= − ෍ 𝑁௜𝑃௜௝
𝜕𝑢௜௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ௜௝
− 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= 
= 𝑁ଵ𝑃ଵଵ − ෍ 𝑁௜𝑃௜௝𝑞௜௝(1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ௜௝
− 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= 
= 𝐷ଵଵ − (1 − 𝜏) ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
− 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= 
= 𝐷ଵଵ − (1 − 𝜏) ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
− 𝜏 ෍ ቆ
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝ + 𝛾௝
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
ቇ
௝
= 
= 𝐷ଵଵ − ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
− 𝜏 ෍ 𝛾௝
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ௝
 
 
(11) 
∎ 
This is a very intuitive result. Let us talk about the representation in the first row of (10) first. The 
first term is the marginal change in the consumer surplus and comprises the direct effect on 
consumers of reduced transport costs and changed work location choices. The second term is the 
increase in tax revenues. The third term is the wage increase, net of taxes, that follows the 
commuting cost reduction; this component accrues to workers but is external to their commute 
decision as each individual worker has no impact on wages.  
The second row of (10) is also informative as it splits the welfare effect into the direct effect, 
spillovers and matching. The first term is still the marginal change in the consumer surplus. The 
second term is the benefit due to changes in wage rates (per productivity unit), holding work 
location choices constant, such that the changes act only through changes in job-to-job 
accessibility; the second term thus captures the effect of spillovers. The third term is the change 
in tax revenues due to changed job choices. It then captures the part of the matching effect that is 
external to the workers’ commuting decision. The net-of-tax effect on wages of changed job 
choices is already captured in the consumer surplus. 
As has been noted, 𝛾௝  is constant and equal to 1 if 𝜂௝ = 0. If all 𝜂௝ = 0, then the spillover effect is 
zero and only the matching effect remains. If 𝜂௝ > 0, the spillover effect for each job type 𝑗 is equal 
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to the relative change in accessibility multiplied by the output and the spillover parameter for that 
zone: డఊೕ
డ௖భభ
𝐿௝ = 𝜂௝𝑌௝
ങಲೕ
ങ೎భభ
஺ೕ
. 
The effect of a change in a job-to-job transport cost is slightly different, since these affect workers’ 
job choices only through the wage rates, which are taken as given by workers. Without loss of 
generality, we consider a change in job-to-job transport cost 𝑑ଵଵ. 
Theorem 2. The welfare effect of a job-to-job transport cost reduction is 
 
−
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑑ଵଵ
= 𝜏
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑑ଵଵ
− (1 − 𝜏) ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑑ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
= 
= − ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑑ଵଵ
𝐿௝
௝
− 𝜏 ෍ 𝛾௝
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑑ଵଵ௝
. 
(12) 
 
The first row decomposes the welfare effect into increased tax revenues and the after-tax part of 
increased wage rates due to spillovers. The second row decomposes the welfare effect into 
increased wage rates due to spillovers and increased tax revenues from matching effects. 
Proof.  
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1.  ∎ 
 
In the first row of (10), the first term is the total increase in tax revenues, and the second term is 
the after-tax part of wage rate changes, which accrue to workers. In the second row, the first term 
is the spillover effect, capturing benefits to workers of wage rate changes through changes in job-
to-job accessibility. Again, this is zero if 𝜂௝  are equal to zero such that there is no spillover effect. 
The second term is the matching effect, capturing the change in tax revenues due to changed job 
choices holding wage rates constant. 
A marginal change in the transport network will lead to changes in both commuting costs 𝑐௜௝  and 
job-to-job transport cost 𝑑௝௞  and the effects must then be added to obtain the full welfare impact.  
In conventional transport CBA, only the consumer surplus from a transport improvement is 
included. Theorems 1 and 2 show that it is always correct to add the change in total tax revenues, 
regardless of the source or mechanism generating the increase in tax revenues. They may be due 
either to reduced commuting costs or to reduced job-to-job transport costs, or both; they may be 
generated by spillovers or matching or both; either way, the entire increase in tax revenues should 
be added to the CBA. For the after-tax part of an output increase, however, the analyst needs to 
distinguish between output effects generated by spillovers and matching. Only the former should 
be added to the CBA, since the after-tax benefits from matching are already included in the 
consumer surplus. However, few (if any) empirical estimates of the relationship between 
accessibility and economic output make this distinction: the contributions from matching and 
spillovers are confounded.  
Section 4 below presents some simulation results that provide an impression of the magnitude of 
the effects involved. The simulation also illustrates the confounding of spillovers and matching in 
the output/accessibility relationships that can be observed at aggregate levels. Before that, we 
provide some analytical results for a simplified version of the model. 
3. Analysis of simplified model 
The representation of the spillover effect through job-to-job accessibility makes the derivation of 
analytical results a quite daunting task that involves much complex and not very transparent 
mathematical notation. We therefore undertake some analysis of the model under the 
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simplification that 𝑤(0) = 1 and 𝑤(𝑑) = 0 for 𝑑 > 0, such that 𝐴௝ = 𝐿௝  and 𝑌 = ∑ 𝐿௝
ଵାఎೕ
௝ . Under 
this simplification, only jobs of type 𝑗 contribute spillover effects to jobs of type 𝑗 and job-to-job 
transport costs play no role. It is intuitive to think of j as a specific industry cluster. We can think 
of no essential reason why the results that we will derive for the simplified model should not also 
apply to the full model. 
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
When all 𝜂௝ = 0, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is trivial since wage rates are 
constant in this case. This is no longer the case when 𝜂௝ > 0, since then the wage rate at job 𝑗 is 
determined by the number of workers there, while the number of workers at each job is 
determined by the set of wage rates. Equilibrium still exists as shown in the following theorem, 
but may not be unique. It is easy to construct an example where there are multiple equilibria: if 
there are just two ex ante identical work locations, then equilibrium employment may concentrate 
in either location or be evenly split among them. The following theorem shows however that 
equilibrium is necessarily unique provided 𝜂௝  are sufficiently small. 
Theorem 3. Equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium exists uniquely when 𝜂௝ are sufficiently small. 
Proof. Consider the mapping Γ, which takes a wage rate vector 𝛾 = ൫𝛾ଵ, … , 𝛾௃൯ into a new wage 
rate vector Γ(𝛾), with components given by Γ(௝) = 𝛾௝ = 𝐿௝
ఎೕ  where 𝐿௝ = ∑ 𝑞௜௝𝐺௝(𝑖)𝑁௜௜  is regarded 
as a function of vector 𝛾.  
A fixed point for Γ is an equilibrium in the model. We will show that a fixed point always exists 
and that it is unique when 𝜂௝  are small by applying the Schauder and Banach fixed point theorems.   
First, we shall compute the Jacobian of Γ: it has elements  
 Γ௞
(௝)(𝛾) = 𝜂௝𝐿௝
ఎೕିଵ(1 − τ) ෍ 𝑞௜௝𝑞௜௞𝐺௝௞(𝑖)𝑁௜
௜
. (13) 
Then Γ is continuously differentiable. Its domain is a compact convex set, since the wage rate at 
any job is bounded by the wage rate that would result if the whole population worked at that 
location. Hence the domain also contains the range of Γ. This is sufficient for the Schauder fixed 
point theorem which establishes that an equilibrium exists.  
Using (3),  
 ෍ ቚΓ௞
(௝)(𝛾)ቚ
௞
= 𝜂௝(1 − τ)𝛾௝𝐿௝ିଵ ෍ 𝑞௜௝𝑞௜௞2𝐺௝௝(𝑖)𝑁௜
௜
. (14) 
By the regularity conditions imposed on 𝐺 and 𝑓, the sum on the RHS in (14) is uniformly bounded. 
We then only need to consider 𝛾௝𝐿௝ିଵ. But 𝛾௝ ≤ 𝑁
୫ୟ୶
ೕ
ఎೕ , where 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁௜௜ > 1 is the total population 
in the model. Finally, we need a lower bound for 𝐿௝: this exists since 𝑃௜௝ > 0 everywhere and 
transport costs and wages are bounded. Combining these bounds, we find that ∑ ቚΓ𝑘
(𝑗)(𝛾)ቚ𝑘 ≤ 𝜂𝑗𝐾 
for some 𝐾 > 0. Hence the norm of the Jacobian of Γ is smaller than 1 when 𝜂௝  are sufficiently 
small. Then the Banach fixed point theorem applies and this completes the proof. ∎ 
3.2 The production consequences of a transport improvement 
It is important to understand when a transport improvement can be expected to increase total 
output. As we shall see, it can even be the case that a transport improvement will decrease total 
output. Moreover, a change in output translates directly into the welfare effects in (10) and (12) 
since we may decompose an output change into spillover and matching effects by 
 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐௜௝
= ෍
𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝑐௜௝
𝐿௝
௝
+ ෍ 𝛾௝
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐௜௝௝
, (15) 
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with a similar decomposition applying for a change in job-to-job transport costs.  
It is therefore important to understand when a transport improvement will increase or decrease 
total output. In general, we expect a transport improvement affecting high-productivity jobs to 
lead to an increase in total production and conversely for a transport improvement affecting low-
productivity jobs. This phenomenon requires the matching mechanism, since if local effective 
labor supplies 𝐿௝  are held constant then a transport cost reduction can only increase job-to-job 
accessibility and thereby increase local wage rates. 
In order to show that a transport improvement may decrease total output, we consider a 
simplified version of the model where worker-job specific productivities factor into worker and 
job-specific productivity effects 𝑞௜௝ = 𝑞௜𝑎௝ , and where the strength of the spillover effect is the 
same for all jobs, i.e. 𝜂௝ = 𝜂. The separability of 𝑞௜௝  implies that  
 
 ෍
𝐿௝
𝑎௝௝
= ෍ 𝑞௜𝑃௜௝𝑁௜
௜௝
= ෍ 𝑞௜𝑁௜
௜
,  
which is constant, so this implies  
 
𝑎ଵିଵ
𝜕𝐿ଵ
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= − ෍ 𝑎ଵ
ି௝ 𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ௝வଵ
, (16) 
which can be used to rewrite the effect on total output of a change in commuting cost 𝑐ଵଵ: 
 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
෍ 𝐿௝
ଵାఎ
௝
= (1 + 𝜂) ෍ 𝐿௝
ఎ
௝
𝑎௝𝑎௝ିଵ
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
= [𝑢𝑠𝑒 (15)]
= (1 + 𝜂) ෍൫𝛾௝𝑎௝ − 𝛾ଵ𝑎ଵ൯
௝வଵ
𝜕𝐿௝
𝜕𝑐ଵଵ
. 
(17) 
As to the signs of the derivatives of 𝐿௝ , we have 
డ௅భ
డ௖భభ
> 0 and డ௅ೕ
డ௖భభ
< 0 for all 𝑗 > 1. This is because 
the first-order effect of a reduction in 𝑐ଵଵ is an increase in 𝐷ଵଵ, which increases 𝐿ଵ and reduces all 
other 𝐿௝ , which in turn causes the wage rate to increase (weakly) at work location 1 and to 
decrease (weakly) at all other locations. This effect is amplified, since the change in wage rates 
increases commuting to location 1 and decreases commuting to all other locations. The sign of 
(17) is still ambiguous in general, but can be signed when work location 1 has the smallest or 
largest productivity. When 𝛾ଵ𝑎ଵ < 𝛾௝𝑎௝ , ∀𝑗 > 1, then −
డ௒
డ௖భభ
< 0 and conversely when 𝛾ଵ𝑎ଵ >
𝛾௝𝑎௝ , ∀𝑗 > 1. This implies that a transport cost reduction for commuting to the least productive 
work location will decrease total production, while a transport cost reduction for commuting to 
most productive work location will increase total production.  
In the general case, without the simplifying assumptions made above in this subsection, we expect 
the same result to hold except in extreme cases where many workers are each more productive 
in jobs with low wage rates. In general, a transport cost reduction may then be expected to 
increase (decrease) total production if it improves commuter accessibility to the more (less) 
productive work locations.   
3.3 The production consequences of a change in the income tax rate 
The next theorem establishes conditions that ensure the intuitive result that an increase in the 
income tax rate will cause a decrease in production.  
Theorem 4. If all 𝜂௝ = 0 then 
డ௒
డఛ
≤ 0. If the Hessian of at least one 𝐺(𝑖) is positive definite, then 
డ௒
డఛ
< 0 for 𝜂௝  sufficiently close to zero. 
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Proof.  We begin with the effect on the wage rate at each work location, using 𝑌௝ = 𝐿௝
ଵାఎೕ = 𝛾௝
ആೕ
భశആೕ  
to express that in terms of the effect on the output at location 𝑗: 
 𝜕𝛾௝
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜂௝
1 + 𝜂௝
𝐿௝ିଵ
𝜕𝑌௝
𝜕𝜏
. (18) 
 
From (18), observe that all 𝜂௝ = 0 implies that 
డఊೕ
డఛ
= 0. In that case,  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝜏
= ෍ 𝛾௝𝑞௜௝
𝜕𝐺௝(𝑖)
𝜕𝜏
𝑁௜
௜௝
 
= − ෍ ቌ෍ 𝛾௝𝑞௜௝𝐺௝௞(𝑖)𝛾௞𝑞௜௞
௝௞
 ቍ 𝑁௜
௜
. 
1. The first conclusion that డ௒
డఛ
≤ 0 follows since the Hessian all 𝐺(𝑖) is positive semidefinite. If it 
is positive definite for some 𝑖 then the second conclusion that డ௒
డఛ
< 0 follows when all 𝜂௝ = 0. 
Then by continuity, the conclusion also follows for small 𝜂௝ > 0. ∎ 
4. Simulation results 
In this section, we illustrate our results using a simulation setup of the model.  
Consider a linear city with 21 zones, spaced 6 kms apart. The intrazonal trip distance is 3 kms. 
Each zone contains both workers and workplaces. Travel speed is 40 km/h door-to-door, the 
travel cost is 0.2 €/km and the value of time is 10 €/hour, which gives a generalized travel cost 
(both ways) to a workplace zone at distance 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 of 𝑐 = ቀ0.2 + ଵ଴
ସ଴
ቁ ∙ 2 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡. Idiosyncratic utilities 
𝜖 are extreme value type I (Gumbel) with dispersion parameter 𝜇 = 0.4.  
The productivity of a worker of type i at location j is 𝑞௜௝ . Index i denotes a combination of location 
zone and worker type (education, idiosyncratic skills etc). The productivities 𝑞௜௝  are drawn from 
a uniform distribution (130 − ∆𝑞, 130 + ∆𝑞) €/day. The spread in productivities ∆𝑞 is varied in 
the simulations around a value of ∆𝑞 = 50. In the simulation, we assume 1000 worker types (each 
with mass 1) per zone, meaning that we draw 1000 𝑞௜௝  per residential zone i. The tax rate is 𝜏 =
0.4. 
The decay function 𝑤(𝑑௝௞) in the job-to-job accessibility measure is taken to be 𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯ = ൫𝑑௝௞൯
ିఈ. 
The decay parameter 𝛼 is varied in the simulations around a value of 𝛼 = 1 (taken from 
estimations in Graham (2007)). Job-to-job transport costs are assumed to be equal to commuting 
transport costs except that intra-zonal transport costs are normalized to 1. The local spillover 
parameter 𝜂 is taken to be independent of location 𝑗 and is varied in the simulations around a 
value of 𝜂 = 0.01.  
The parameters are chosen such that the output elasticity, transport cost elasticities and average 
trip length are in line with typical empirical evidence (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Elasticities of the calibrated model compared to reference values from the literature.  
Elasticity Simulation 
model 
Reference value(s) from literature 
Total VKT wrt. travel 
cost 
0.23 0.23 (Bastian, Börjesson, & Eliasson, 2016) (value for Sweden) 
0.22 (Small & Van Dender, 2007) 
0.26 (de Jong & Gunn, 2001) 
Total VKT wrt. travel 
time 
0.29 0.29 (de Jong & Gunn, 2001) 
Total VKT wrt. 
generalized travel cost 
0.53 Implied by the elasticities above together with average speed, 
travel cost per km and the valuation of travel time (taken from 
Börjesson and Eliasson (2014)),  
Total output wrt. 
accessibility  
0.04 0.06 (Ciccone & Hall, 1996) 
0.05 (Ciccone, 2002) 
0.03-0.05 (Anderstig et al., 2016) 
0.02-0.10; typical values according to Graham and van Dender 
(2011) 
0.04-0.11; typical values according to Venables (2007) 
 
The equilibrium in the simulation model was calculated by computing commuting patterns given 
the wage rates 𝛾௝ in each zone, then calculating new wage rates given these commuting patterns, 
and iterating until convergence. Different starting points for 𝛾௝  were tested to check for multiple 
equilibria, but no such were found.  
4.1 Spatial structure 
Figure 1 below illustrates simulation results varying the spillover parameter 𝜂 between 0 and 
0.02.  The left panel shows the number of workers commuting to each zone, while the right panel 
shows the average output per worker in each zone. Since we are simulating a random distribution 
of productivities, the number of workers per zone becomes somewhat irregular, but the tendency 
that workers concentrate in central zones is clear. 
 
  
Figure 1. Number of workers per zone (left); average output per worker (€/day) (right). 𝜼 = 𝟎 black, 𝜼 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
red, 𝜼 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 blue.  
We observe that workers tend to concentrate in the central zones, even when 𝜂 = 0. This happens 
since job-worker productivity levels 𝑞௜௝  vary randomly, while average transport costs are lowest 
to central locations, which means that more workers will find their optimal work location in a 
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central zone. We thus see that matching alone, even in the absence of spillover effects, will cause 
jobs to concentrate in central zones and wages to be higher there. 
A positive value of the spillover parameter 𝜂 reinforces this matching effect by increasing the wage 
rate in the central zones. This induces some workers to change their work location to the central 
zones, which further increases the wage rate in the central zones. In the 𝜂 = 0 scenario, the highest 
zonal average output per worker is 2.2% higher than the lowest zonal average. This ratio increases 
to 2.5% when 𝜂 = 0.01 and to 2.9% when 𝜂 = 0.02.   
4.2 Output changes due to matching and spillovers 
As explained above, a change in transport costs affects total output through two mechanisms, 
matching and spillovers. The strength of the matching effect is determined by the heterogeneity 
of the productivity of job-worker combinations, controlled in the simulation by the parameter ∆𝑞. 
With much heterogeneity there is much scope for a reduction in transport costs to induce workers 
to commute to locations where they are more productive.  
The strength of the spillover effect is determined by the size of the parameter 𝜂. The spillover 
effect is zero if 𝜂 = 0, but even then a reduction in transport costs will improve matching and 
hence increase total output.   
Table 2 and Table 3 show some consequences of varying the spillover parameter and the degree 
of heterogeneity of individual productivities. We find as expected that the elasticity of output with 
respect to a proportional change in generalized transport costs increases as the spillover 
parameter increases and as the degree of heterogeneity of productivity increases. The same 
output elasticity can then result at many combinations of the level of spillovers and heterogeneity.  
 
Table 2. Variation in local spillover 𝛈 (with constant 𝜟𝒒 = 𝟓𝟎) 
 𝜂 = 0 𝜂 = 0.01 𝜂 = 0.02 
Elasticity of output 
w.r.t. travel cost -0.032 -0.039 -0.047 
Elasticity of VKT 
w.r.t. generalized 
travel cost 
-0.53 -0.52 -0.53 
Average commuting 
distance (km) 8.9 9.3 9.7 
 
Table 3. Variation in productivity heterogeneity 𝚫𝒒 (with constant 𝜼 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
 ∆𝑞 = 0 ∆𝑞 = 30 ∆𝑞 = 50 ∆𝑞 = 100 
Elasticity of output 
w.r.t. generalized 
travel cost 
-0.012 -0.037 -0.039 -0.049 
Elasticity of VKT 
w.r.t. generalized 
travel cost 
-1.21 -0.58 -0.52 -0.44 
Average commuting 
distance (km) 5.1 7.8 9.3 11.9 
 
 
4.3 The social benefits of a transport cost reduction 
Consider a project that reduces all generalized transport costs by 10%. Table 4 shows the 
associated welfare gain for some combinations of 𝜂 and ∆𝑞 that yield roughly the same output 
elasticities. Benefits are divided into three parts: change in consumer surplus (calculated by the 
rule-of-a-half), increased tax revenues due to matching, and spillover benefits. The latter two 
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components are the ones that are omitted from conventional transport CBA, so the sum of these 
is presented in the column “total wider benefits”. All wider benefits are shown as relative 
additions to the consumer surplus.  
 
Table 4. Consumer surplus and wider benefits of a 10% transport cost reduction, for different parameter 
combinations. 
𝜂 ∆𝑞 Elasticity of 
output wrt. 
transport cost 
Change in 
consumer 
surplus 
Increased tax revenues 
due to matching  
(in % of CS) 
Spillover 
benefits 
(in % of CS) 
Total wider 
benefits 
(in % of CS) 
0 100 0.038 20976 27% 0% 27% 
0.01 50 0.039 16873 27% 21% 48% 
0.02 10 0.040 9863 22% 65% 87% 
0.03 0 0.038 7469 1% 139% 140% 
 
Since the matching effect is partly internalized by commuters while the spillover effect is external, 
the wider benefits of a project generating a change in economic output will be different depending 
on how much of the output change is due to spillovers or matching. Table 4 illustrates this: 
although the output elasticity is about the same in all four scenarios, the size of the wider benefits 
relative to the conventional consumer surplus varies substantially, since the output effect may be 
generated completely by matching (row 1), completely by spillovers (row 4) or by a combination 
(rows 2 and 3).  
4.4 Confounding of matching and spillovers 
So we see that different combinations of 𝜂 and ∆𝑞 may lead to the same output elasticity but will 
imply very different welfare implications of a transport cost reduction. In table 4, the size of the 
wider economic effect relative to the change in consumer surplus varies by more than a factor 4, 
depending on whether the increase in output is due to matching or spillovers. This shows that it 
is crucial that empirical studies of agglomeration effects take both matching and spillovers into 
account and that they are properly able to distinguish matching effects from spillovers. Our 
reading of the literature suggests that studies that manage to do that are rare. 
Assume for the sake of example that the spillover parameter 𝜂 is constant across zones. 
Production is then 
 
𝑌௝ = 𝑞ത௝𝑁௝ ൭෍ 𝑞ത௞𝑁௞𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯
௞
൱
ఎ
, (19) 
where 𝑞ത௝ is the average productivity of workers in zone j. Adding noise terms and assuming for 
simplicity that the decay function 𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯ is known, it is possible in principle to estimate 𝜂 through 
the regression  
 
ln
𝑌௝
𝑁௝
= ln 𝑞ത௝ + 𝜂 ln ൭෍ 𝑞ത௞𝑁௞𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯
௞
൱ + 𝜀௝. 
 
(20) 
This requires, however, that the average productivities 𝑞ത௝ are observable, which may be 
challenging in practice. An analyst who is unable to observe 𝑞ത௝  might instead estimate 𝛽 in the 
following simplified regression:  
 
ln
𝑌௝
𝑁௝
= 𝑐 + 𝛽 ln ൭෍ 𝑁௞𝑤൫𝑑௝௞൯
௞
൱ + 𝜀௝ . (21) 
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This specification has been used in the economic literature (Graham, 2007, Rice et al, 2006) and 
the accessibility measure (multiplied by the parameter 𝛽) is often called the effective density. The 
parameter 𝛽 measures the elasticity of output per worker with respect to effective density.  
It is clear that an estimate of 𝛽 is not an estimate of 𝜂. From Table 4 it is also clear that the same 
correlation between transport costs and output can be generated from a range of combinations of 
η and ∆𝑞. But Table 4 also shows that it matters very much for the assessment of the wider impacts 
of a transport cost reduction whether these are due to matching or spillovers. It is then potentially 
quite misleading if an estimate of 𝛽 is misinterpreted as an estimate of a pure spillover effect. 
4.5 Job-to-job accessibility: the decay function 
The size of the spillover effect depends on the decay function, regulated by the distance decay 
parameter 𝛼. The higher 𝛼 is, the faster is the decay and the more local is the job-to-job spillover 
effect. This is illustrated in Table 5 (with 𝜂 = 0.01, ∆𝑞 = 50). 
Table 5. Consumer surplus and wider benefits of a 10% transport cost reduction, for different values of the 
distance decay. 
𝛼 Elasticity 
of output 
w.r.t. gen. 
transport 
cost 
Elasticity 
of VKT 
w.r.t. gen. 
transport 
cost 
Change in 
consumer 
surplus 
Incr. tax 
revenues 
from 
matching 
(in % of 
CS) 
Spillover 
benefits 
(in % of 
CS) 
Total 
wider 
benefits 
(in % of 
CS) 
1 0.039 -0.52 16 873 27% 21% 48% 
2 0.037 -0.52 16 814 26% 16% 42% 
4 0.031 -0.52 16 797 26% 3% 29% 
∞ 0.030 -0.52 16 796 26% 1% 27% 
 
Note that the VKT elasticity, the consumer surplus and the tax revenues caused by matching 
effects are virtually unaffected by the value of the decay parameter 𝛼. The spillover effect and 
hence the size of the wider benefits, however, depend strongly on 𝛼. For high 𝛼 values, spillover 
benefits are only generated by workers choosing other job locations, i.e. relocation effects. For 
lower 𝛼 values, spillovers also increase when job-to-job transport costs decrease. 
As pointed out earlier, measuring job-to-job transport costs and how spillover effects decrease 
with such costs is difficult, and our understanding of them is still limited compared to our 
understanding of commuting costs.  
4.6 Comparing different transport improvements 
As was pointed out in section 3.2, total output may increase or decrease depending on where 
transport costs change. Output will decrease if workers are attracted to less productive zones, and 
vice versa. Moreover, two projects with similar effects in terms of consumer surplus may have 
quite different total benefits when wider impacts are taken into account. The next example 
illustrates this.  
Consider two projects, A and B, chosen to yield similar conventional consumer surpluses. In 
project A, transport costs on the links between the central zones 9-13 are reduced by 60%. In 
project B, transport costs on the links between the peripheral zones 1-3 and 19-21 are reduced 
by 100% (intra-zonal costs still apply, though). Table 6 below shows aggregate benefits of these 
projects (assuming parameters 𝜂 = 0.01 and ∆𝑞 = 50). 
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Table 6. Consumer surplus and wider benefits of two reductions of transport costs.  
Project Change in 
consumer 
surplus 
Incr. tax revenues 
from matching 
(in % of CS) 
Spillover 
benefits 
(in % of CS) 
Total wider 
benefits (in % of 
CS) 
A (reduced cost on 
central links) 19 276 37% 26% 64% 
B (reduced cost on 
peripheral links) 19 096 8% 31% 40% 
 
The two projects yield similar consumer surplus, and would hence yield similar benefits in a 
conventional CBA. Their wider economic benefits are different, however. Project A reduces 
transport costs to the most productive zones, so the aggregate output effect is large. Project B, on 
the other hand, reduces transport costs to the least productive zones, so the wider impacts are 
smaller. Another difference is that project A generates much larger matching benefits, since 
transport costs to already productive zones are reduced. Project B, on the other hand, generates 
larger spillover benefits, since job-to-job accessibility in zones with relatively low accessibility is 
improved.  
The important lesson here is that accounting for wider impact may show that projects which seem 
equivalent in a conventional CBA may in fact yield quite different benefits when wider impacts are 
taken into account. Taking matching and spillovers into account may then affect the ranking of 
projects. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has analyzed the welfare effects of transport improvements within a general 
framework that incorporates matching, spillovers and an income tax. It seems worthwhile to 
summarize the main results:  
A transport project leads to wider economic impacts beyond the change in consumer surplus 
through matching and through spillovers. The wider economic impacts of projects may differ even 
if they yield the same change in consumer surplus, so accounting for wider impacts may be 
important when ranking projects in terms of cost efficiency.  
The matching effect relate to the matching of workers to jobs, holding wages constant at each 
possible worker-job combination. The matching effect is partly internalized by workers in their 
choice of job. But changes among jobs paying different wages leads to a change in income tax 
revenues, which should be accounted for in the welfare calculus. The change in income tax 
revenues due to matching resulting from a reduction in transport costs may be positive or 
negative.   
The spillover effect works through wage changes, holding matches constant.  The spillover effect 
is entirely external to the commuting decisions of workers and should be added to the consumer 
surplus in its entirety.  
Adding the entire output change resulting from a transport project to a conventional CBA will 
hence result in double-counting if some of the output change is due to matching effects. Only 
increased tax revenues and the after-tax part of the output change that is due to spillovers should 
be added. As illustrated in the simulations, the size of the wider benefits may differ substantially 
even if the output elasticity is the same, depending on whether the change in output is due to 
matching, spillovers or a combination. The problem of econometrically distinguishing between 
matching and spillover contribution to output effects is not trivial, however, since matching and 
spillover effects both contribute to generating correlation between confounded agglomeration 
and output.  
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Our results differ from the influential paper by Venables (2007). The fundamental difference is 
that Venables does not allow for matching effects, and hence all agglomeration effects in his model 
are external to workers. 
It was noted already by Forsyth (1980) that the change in tax revenues should be included in the 
cost-benefit analysis of a transport improvement. This insight has been slow to make its way into 
practice. A difficulty has been calculating the change in output following a transport improvement.  
However, empirical estimates of the causal impact of accessibility improvements on wages or 
more generally on value added are now becoming available (Börjesson et al., 2015; Combes & 
Gobillon, 2014; Graham, 2007a, 2007b; Norman et al., 2017; Rice, Venables, & Patacchini, 2006). 
The current research agenda is by no means exhausted, of course. Perhaps the most pressing issue 
from the perspective of this paper is to distinguish matching and spillover effects empirically and 
to find ways of predicting these effects that can be applied in cost-benefit analysis of transport 
projects and policies.  
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